

**Fear & Loathing in Los Angeles?
Race & Racial Attitudes a Decade After the 1992 Riots**

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Introduction

Los Angeles recently marked an anniversary. The date held significance not only for the city's residents but also for national and international observers who "have come to regard Los Angeles as emblematic of our collective urban future." (Dear 2000, 7) A decade ago, that future appeared bleak. On April 29, 1992, following the acquittal of four Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers charged in the videotaped beating of African American motorist Rodney King and weeks after a Korean American shopkeeper received five years probation in the shooting death of a Black teen, Los Angeles erupted in the most lethal civil disturbances in the nation's history. From the riot epicenter at the intersection of Florence and Normandie, some 50,000 participated in the violence that engulfed the rest of South Central Los Angeles, spread north and west into Koreatown and Hollywood, to the outskirts of Beverly Hills and West Los Angeles, and into the San Fernando Valley. (Cannon, 1997; Davis, 1993a, 144; Delk, 1995; *Los Angeles Times*, 1992)

Over the course of five days, at least 52 people were killed in riot-related incidents, 2,383 suffered injuries serious enough to require hospitalization, and 850 families were rendered homeless. Arsonists set over 600 fires, damaging or destroying more than 1,100 buildings. Property losses totaled nearly \$1 billion. Of the 20,000 jobs that went up in smoke, 5,000 were considered long-term losses.¹ Dubbed America's first multiethnic riot, approximately 36 percent of those arrested in the rioting were African American and just over 50 percent were Latino. Rioters focused their wrath on Korean American-owned businesses and property – more than 2,280 of these structures were damaged or destroyed, and most of the \$400 million in these property losses was not

covered by insurance. Other flashpoints occurred as far away as Long Beach and Riverside. As media outlets transmitted the events in real time across America and around the world, civil disturbances were touched off in 30 cities across the nation including San Francisco, Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Chicago. Before order in Los Angeles was restored, 3,700 police and sheriff officers were joined by 2,300 Highway Patrol personnel, 10,000 National Guard troops, and 4,000 active duty U.S. soldiers and Marines. (Davis 1992b; Keil 1998, 205; Morrison and Lowry 1994, 38; Ong and Hee 1993, 9; Petersilia and Abrahamse 1994, 141; Rosenfeld 1997; Tierney 1994, 153)

In the days and months that followed, Los Angeles and the nation struggled to make sense of what had happened and why. Policy makers, journalists, scholars, and the general public could not even agree on the words to adequately describe the tragic events – riots, uprising, disturbances, or civil unrest. A consensus emerged over the subsequent decade that three interrelated trends and conditions created a tinderbox in which the acquittal of Rodney King’s assailants was merely a spark: (1) racial discord heightened by dramatic demographic shifts; (2) social polarization exacerbated by a yawning divide between those who have and those who have too little; and (3) local and national policy makers’ chronic neglect of low-income urban communities.

To what extent can the city of angels still be characterized – as it was recently by Reuters – as “a modern hell of racial tension, social neglect, and glaring disparity between rich and poor”? (Reuters 2002) A recent public opinion poll contains several surprising perspectives on this question. (Guerra and Marks 2002) The results suggest the city’s social fabric is far stronger than conventional wisdom about Los Angeles would predict. Perceptions of ethnic relations have markedly improved. Residents are more upbeat about the direction of the city and even more upbeat about their neighborhoods.

There are also refreshing signs of community spiritedness – from the regularity with which neighbors are talking across the back fence to the willingness of many Angelenos to shoulder higher municipal taxes and fees if doing so would prevent cutbacks in public services. Although Angelenos lack great confidence in the city’s formal governmental institutions and local elected officials, they give high marks to other civic leaders and civic institutions. In short, Angelenos are upbeat about many aspects of life in their city. Nevertheless, a dark cloud surrounds this silver lining: Despite these positive indicators, half of those surveyed believe another riot is likely to occur within the next few years.

Attitudes about the factors generally blamed for creating tinderbox conditions in 1992 – perceptions of racial issues, perceptions of the strength of the city’s social fabric, and perceptions of civic leaders and institutions – have an impact on residents’ expectations of future riots. However, close inspection reveals some surprises. Specifically, race matters but not in the way many might expect. Attitudes about racial issues and perceptions of black civic leaders have far more influence on expectations of future riots than the respondent’s ethnicity. Optimism and pessimism regarding political and economic trends in Los Angeles are also important, as is the length of time the respondent has lived in Los Angeles. In this analysis we take a close look at these relationships. After describing the sampling and interview procedure employed for the survey, we explore how a city devastated and divided was not beyond hope and healing. We also explore why so many residents nevertheless remain wary of additional riots.

The Survey

During February and March 2002, interviews were conducted by telephone in English or Spanish with 1,600 adult residents of the City of Los Angeles. Each interview

lasted an average of twenty minutes. Respondents were selected using random digit dial (RDD) sampling from a list of all active residential phone numbers in the zip codes within city limits. RDD sampling draws from a universe of listed and unlisted phone numbers. The protocol for this study involved asking potential respondents a series of screening questions to verify the respondent resided within the City of Los Angeles and was at least 18 years old. To correct for the tendency of the RDD method to over-sample older residents and women – who are more likely to be home in the early evening or on the weekend and are also more likely to answer the telephone – interviewers asked to speak to the youngest male in the household. If the youngest adult male was not available at the time of the call, the interviewer asked to speak to the youngest adult female at home. These screens were employed until the proportions for gender and age approximated the proportions found in the city’s overall population.

Because we wished to explore in detail the responses to the survey within specific zip codes, a strategic over-sample of residents in particular zip codes was conducted. To adjust for the strategic over-sample and for a slight disparity in age between the sample and the age distributions according to the 2000 Census, the survey responses were weighted to ensure that the aggregated results are representative of city residents as a whole. Given the randomized procedure for selecting respondents, the size of the city’s adult population, and a sample size of 1,600 respondents, the maximum margin of error for questions answered by all 1,600 respondents in this study is +/- 2.5 percent.

The Tinderbox

To begin to unwind the public’s apparently inconsistent views a decade after the riots, it may be useful to reflect on the leading scholarship and punditry regarding the

meaning and causes of the riots. The riots were widely proclaimed a “bloody wakeup call” for America and beyond. (Steinberg 1995, 204) A *New York Times* headline announced, “Los Angeles Riots are a Warning, Americans Fear.” (Turner, 1992) Others went further, contending that the Los Angeles riots were “part of an urban revolution taking place on all six inhabited continents.” In the words of a United Nations advisor, “Los Angeles is symptomatic of a global trend, and every city in the world should take note of what happened in Los Angeles. It sent us all an important message.” (Wright, 1992) For the Monday morning quarterbacks, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the riot was that it did not occur sooner. With ten years to reflect on the conditions that had made Los Angeles a tinderbox, the city’s leading chroniclers have identified three interrelated factors: racial discord heightened by the city’s rapid demographic transformation, social polarization exacerbated by economic restructuring, and misguided local and national governmental policies.

The scale and rapidity of Los Angeles’ demographic shifts and the potential for racial discord was the most visible of these three factors. Table 1 summarizes these shifts from 1970 through 2000. Despite assurances from various civic leaders that the city’s ethnic mix comprised a “beautiful mosaic,” (*Los Angeles 2000 Committee* 1988) interethnic tension and conflict became a palpable force long before the 1992 riots. (Keil 1998, Bobo et al. 1994) When riots erupted in Watts nearly three decades earlier, Los Angeles had been a predominantly White city. By 1992, Whites were a little more than a third of the population. Immigration, particularly from Mexico, helped fuel the dramatic demographic transformation. (Allen and Turner 1997; Waldinger 1996) A solidly African American area at the time of the 1965 riots, the population of South-Central Los Angeles was nearly half Latino by 1992. As Watts began holding Cinco de Mayo

parades, “Black versus Brown” conflicts over housing, jobs, political power, and cultural dominance became a disturbing undercurrent in an economically depressed community. (Oliver and Johnson 1984, 59; *Los Angeles Times* 1992, 28; Miles 1992, 59; Skerry 1993, 83-86; Morison and Lowry 1994, 28-29)

Table 1 Demographic Shifts in Los Angeles

Year	Ethnicity			
	White	African American	Latino	Asian
1960	72%	14%	11%	4%
1970	59%	18%	18%	5%
1980	44%	22%	28%	7%
1990	37%	14%	40%	9%
2000	30%	10%	47%	10%

Ethnic succession also strained relations between African Americans and Korean Americans. The lyrics of a 1989 rap song, *Black Korea* – “pay respect to the Black fist, or we’ll burn your store right down to a crisp” – foreshadowed what Korean Americans called the pogrom of April 29 or *Sa-i-gu*. By that time, the 130,000 Korean Americans in Los Angeles had replaced Jewish business owners as the “middle man minorities” in the city’s south-central and Pico Union districts. African Americans complained about price-gouging Korean merchants, and many of these entrepreneurs were victimized by shoplifters and armed robbers. In March 1991, a month before the Rodney King beating, Korean American merchant Soon Ja Du shot dead fifteen year-old African American Latasha Harlins in a dispute over a \$1.79 container of orange juice. When Soon Ja Du received probation for the killing, Korean-owned stores were boycotted and firebombed. (Horne 1995, 109; Cho 1993, 200; Kim 1993, 217, 232; Light and Bonacich 1988, 17-20)

Korean Americans, who comprised less than 1 percent of the city’s population, owned 34

percent of the businesses that were looted or burned when riots erupted the following year. (Bobo et al. 2000, 24; Davis 1992c; Morrison and Lowry 1994, 38; Ong 1996, 165; Petersilia and Abrahamse 1994, 141; Tierney 1994, 153)

Social polarization intensified as the labor force bifurcated into high-skill, high-wage jobs and low-skill, low-wage jobs and as the worst recession in sixty years pummeled the area's job base. The regional unemployment rate rose to 10 percent, a third above the national average, with southern California accounting for 27 percent of the nation's total job losses between 1990 and 1992. (Bobo et al. 2000, 24; Cohen 1993; Ong 1993, 34-35; Ong 1989, 10-14) African Americans and Latinos bore the brunt of the economic dislocations, and residents of South-Central Los Angeles were hit particularly hard. Between 1973 and 1986, the inflation-adjusted annual income of African Americans in Los Angeles dropped by 44 percent. Among Latinos, the drop was 35 percent. The poverty rate in Los Angeles County, which had risen from 11 percent in 1969 to 15 percent 1989, was just half the poverty rate in South-Central. South-Central's unemployment rate was also more than double that of the County, with roughly 50,000 of 90,000 males over the age of 16 either unemployed or not in the labor force. (Horne 1995, 361-362; Grant et al. 1996; U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1993, 88; Navarro 1993, 75; Pastor 1995) Notably, over 80 percent of those arrested during the 1992 riot fit this profile. (Morrison and Lowry 1994, 34-35; DiPasquale 1996, 4; Olzak and Shanahan 1996, 948; Myers 1997)

The internationalization and bifurcation of the Los Angeles labor force were byproducts of larger processes of globalization. A number of commentators have blamed local and national political leadership for failing to respond adequately. (Keil 1998; Fulton 1997; Davis 1990) Mayor Tom Bradley's governing regime has been criticized

for its focus on making Los Angeles a “world-class city” even while living conditions in South-Central, Pico Union, and other neighborhoods became increasingly intolerable. Others note that the decline of federal aid to cities was particularly ill timed. (Wolch 1996, Soja 1996, Dreier et al., 2001) As Keil (1998, 225) argues, “The destructive effect of local policies such as community redevelopment combined with austerity policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations to form an amalgam of negative effects for poor neighborhoods.”

On most measures gauged in the survey reported here, the public’s perception of life in Los Angeles a decade after the riots is less grim than the assessments offered by the pundits and academic experts. That’s good news for all of us, especially to the degree that “in L.A., late twentieth century America finds a mirror to itself.” (Waldinger 1996, 447) The bad news lies in the fact that half of those surveyed find the prospect of additional riots at least somewhat likely. The following section highlights bivariate relationships involving many of the topics explored in the survey in order to draw out some preliminary insights. In the subsequent sections, we formulate multivariate estimates to determine what factors influence perceptions of the likelihood of riots. In these sections we examine both the good news and the bad news in greater detail – highlighting residents’ apparent optimism about life in their city and unwinding the factors that cause so many to remain wary nevertheless.

Life in LA: The Glass Is Half Full

When it comes to the three interrelated factors blamed for fomenting riot conditions in 1992 Los Angeles – negative race relations, social polarization, and poor public leadership – public opinion suggests that Los Angeles is in many respects a

different city than it was ten years ago. Turning first to the question asked by Rodney King while the fires still raged – “Can’t we all just get along?” – most Los Angeles residents are decidedly upbeat. Nearly three-quarters believe that the city’s racial and ethnic groups are getting along very well or somewhat well, and less than one-quarter believe that racial and ethnic groups are getting along very badly or somewhat badly (Table 2). A similar question was asked in a 1997 survey, and at that time, 34 percent rated race relations in Los Angeles as “good” and 59 percent as “not good.” (Guerra 1997) Today, all ethnic groups are fairly upbeat, with margins of three-to-one stating that racial and ethnic groups are getting along very or somewhat well versus very or somewhat badly (74 percent versus 23 percent, $p = .003$).

Table 2 How Well Racial and Ethnic Groups in Los Angeles Are Getting Along

Opinion	1997	2002				
	All	All	White	African American	Latino	Asian
Very well	34%	19%	12%	24%	21%	13%
Somewhat well		56%	59%	49%	57%	54%
Somewhat badly	59%	15%	19%	14%	11%	20%
Very badly		8%	6%	12%	8%	11%

Reflecting on the past ten years, most respondents believe that the people of Los Angeles have made progress toward improving race relations (Table 3). Fifty nine percent believe that progress has been made in the decade since the riots, compared to 33 percent who do not believe that progress has been made. The identical question was asked five years ago, and perceptions have improved since that time when 49 percent

believed that progress toward improving race relations had been made, and 42 percent believed that progress had not been made. (Guerra 1997) Members of all ethnic groups believe that the people of Los Angeles have made progress on race relations over the past decade, but Latinos and Asians are particularly upbeat in their assessments (pr = .006).

Table 3 Since the 1992 Riots and Disturbances, Have the People of Los Angeles Made Progress Toward Improving Race Relations?

Opinion	1997	2002				
	All	All	White	African American	Latino	Asian
Yes	49%	59%	58%	56%	61%	61%
No	42%	33%	34%	39%	31%	28%
Don't Know/ No Answer	9%	9%	9%	5%	8%	10%

Optimism about the state of ethnic relations in Los Angeles and the progress made on human relations since 1992 is remarkable considering the dramatic demographic shifts that transformed Los Angeles in a short span of time (see Table 1). In 1960, Whites accounted for nearly two-thirds of the city’s population. By 2000, they accounted for only 30 percent of the population, while Asians and Pacific Islanders comprised 10 percent of the population, African Americans comprised 11 percent, and Latinos comprised 47 percent. Thus no single racial or ethnic group makes of the majority of the city’s population today, a fact that 46 percent of the survey respondents believe is a good thing, 10 percent believe is a bad thing, and 41 percent believe makes no difference. In contrast to civic boosters, who for more than a decade have stridently insisted on the beauty of the city’s ethnic mosaic, (*Los Angeles 2000 Committee* 1998, 51) many residents are indifferent about the ethnic mix, equally likely to call Los Angeles’ diversity a “good thing” as something that is “neither good nor bad,” something that “just is.”

Post-1965 immigration from Mexico, Central America, and Asia, relatively higher birthrates of Latino immigrants, and the exodus of White residents have dramatically

altered the city’s demographic profile. Although integration of the newcomers has not proceeded smoothly, Table 4 indicates that 61% of the respondents tend to agree that “immigrants today are a benefit to Los Angeles because of their hard work and job skills,” compared to 27 percent who tend to believe that “immigrants today are a burden to Los Angeles because they use public services.” Naturalized citizens (79 percent) and non-citizens (79 percent) are the most likely to agree that immigrants are a benefit to Los Angeles (pr = .000), but U.S.-born citizens are also likely to agree that immigrants are a benefit (55 percent). Given the strength of support for this view among immigrants, it is not surprising that 72 percent of Latinos and 67 percent Asians view immigrants as a benefit to Los Angeles, compared to 54 percent of Whites and 47 percent of African Americans who share that view (pr = .000). In general, Los Angeles residents appear to be more tolerant of immigrants than registered voters who participated in a recent statewide poll – of whom only 46% regard immigrants as a benefit to California compared to 42% who regard immigrants as a burden. (Baldassare 2000)

Table 4 View of Immigrants Closest to Own

Immigrants today are a benefit to LA	61%
Immigrants today are a burden to LA	27%
Don't Know/ No Answer	12%

In addition to poor ethnic relations, many analysts blame a widening social divide for contributing to the tinderbox conditions that existed ten years ago. An economic downturn, such as the one that buffeted the city in the early 1990s, can exacerbate competition for jobs and services and heighten inter-group conflict. Today, respondents are concerned about the effect of state and national economic slowdowns on Los

Angeles, but they are less concerned about the impact on their own pocketbooks. By a two-to-one margin, respondents believe that the sluggish economy will have a very big or big impact on Los Angeles as opposed to a small or no impact. Respondents are more sanguine about the impact of an economic slowdown on their personal finances, with a 53 percent majority anticipating a small impact or no impact, compared to 44 percent who anticipate a big impact or a very big impact. In Table 5, we summarize the distribution of each ethnic group within five income categories. It is plausible that differences in income among ethnic groups may make some ethnic groups more pessimistic about the prospect of riots – a possibility we explore below.

Table 5 Distribution of Income Categories by Race/Ethnic Group

Income	2002				
	All	White	African American	Latino	Asian
<=40K	54%	30%	53%	43%	51%
41K-70K	23%	24%	27%	30%	24%
71K-100K	13%	22%	9%	15%	16%
100K-150K	7%	15%	7%	9%	4%
>150K	4%	9%	4%	2%	4%

Turning to the second category of factors blamed for precipitating the 1992 riots, opinions relevant to social polarization and poor social capital provides mixed evidence. A decade after the jury verdicts and subsequent rioting frayed the city’s social fabric, signs of community bonds also lie in the simple act of neighbors talking or visiting with neighbors. More than three-quarters of Angelenos do so at least once a month, and 36 percent do so just about every day. Fully 40 percent of Whites report talking or visiting

with neighbors just about every day, as do 39 percent of African Americans, 33 percent of Latinos, and 30 percent of Asians (pr= .000).

Optimism about the future, a powerful community asset, is also widespread. Respondents were asked to rate the quality of life, both in Los Angeles as a whole and in their particular neighborhood. As reported in Table 6, 47 percent of respondents feel things in the city are going in the right direction, 30 percent feel things are going in the wrong direction, and 15 percent feel things are staying the same. In essence, respondents are evenly split over whether the city is headed in the right direction or whether the city is staying the same or moving in the wrong direction, but they are more upbeat about the city than respondents in previous polls. A decade ago, 70 percent or more of each major ethnic group told pollsters that Los Angeles had become a worse place to live over the five previous years. (Bobo et al. 1994) Pessimism had declined slightly by 1997 when 48 percent felt things were going in the wrong direction, compared to 32 percent who felt that things in Los Angeles were going in the right direction, and 15 percent who felt things were staying the same. (Guerra 1997)

Table 6 Direction of Los Angeles and its Neighborhoods

Opinion	Los Angeles		Resident's Neighborhood	
	1997	2002	1997	2002
Right direction	32%	47%	44%	55%
Wrong direction	48%	30%	35%	28%
Staying the same	15%	15%	17%	13%

Respondents are even more upbeat about the direction their neighborhood is headed than about the direction of the city as a whole (Table 6). Fifty five percent believe that things in their neighborhood are headed in the right direction, compared to 47

percent who feel the city as a whole is headed in the right direction. Among the ethnic groups, 51 percent of African Americans are optimistic about their neighborhoods, as are 58 percent of Asians, 59 percent of Whites, and 54 percent of Latinos. Residents are also more upbeat about their neighborhoods than they were five years ago when only 44 percent felt things in their neighborhood were headed in the right direction, 35 percent felt things were headed in the wrong direction, and 17 percent felt things were staying the same.

Today as in the past, assessments of the city's direction vary by residents' characteristics. Among major ethnic groups ($p = .000$), Asians are the most likely to be upbeat about the city's direction (61 percent), compared to Latinos (51 percent), African Americans (41 percent), and Whites (45 percent). Relative newcomers to the city – those who have resided in Los Angeles between one and five years – are more upbeat than others about the city's direction. Sixty one percent of these new residents believe the city is on the right track compared to 47 percent overall sharing that optimism ($p = .000$). Not surprisingly, respondents toward the top of the income range are more upbeat than those at the bottom. For example, 45 percent of respondents whose annual household income is less than \$25,000 believe Los Angeles is headed in the right direction, compared to 73 percent of respondents whose annual household income falls in the \$175,000 to \$200,000 range ($p = .009$).

Residents are almost evenly divided over how local government should respond to a revenue shortfall precipitated by the economic slowdown. That 39 percent (Table 6) would prefer increases in municipal taxes and fees to cuts in local services is a striking indication of concern for the community as a whole. These results also point to a public

spiritedness that stands in sharp contrast to much of the post-riot analyses of Los Angeles – “a hideous culture of malice, mistrust, and mutiny.”²

Table 7 To Balance the Budget, City Government Should...

Raise Taxes and Fees	39%
Reduce or Eliminate Services	42%
Don't Know/ No Answer	19%

Poor policy making and civic leadership, the third category of factors blamed for precipitating the 1992 riots, also provides mixed signals. The survey results suggest residents are cautiously optimistic about the ability of civic leaders and civic institutions to respond to the challenges facing Los Angeles. Asked to provide their impressions of leaders and organizations that have been active in public life in Los Angeles, respondents rated each that they had heard of on a scale of 1 (very unfavorable) to 4 (very favorable). None of the civic leaders or institutions received assessments approaching a “very favorable” rating, but the average rating hovers at the “somewhat favorable” level.

In particular, respondents rated the area’s colleges and universities most favorably (3.31), followed by Rebuild Los Angeles (3.19), Los Angeles community-based organizations (3.16), Latino civic leaders (3.15), and the Los Angeles business community (3.14). The Los Angeles press and media received the most unfavorable ratings (2.86), though local elected officials and governing institutions received similar ratings. Tipping toward the unfavorable ratings were assessments of the Los Angeles Unified School District (2.90), the County Board of Supervisors (2.94), the City Council (2.99), and former mayor (2.99).

The bivariate relationships suggest that Los Angeles has moved a long way from

1992's days of rage. In the following sections, we develop multivariate models to ascertain the attitudinal and demographic characteristics that cause 50 percent of all respondents to anticipate an outbreak of additional riots within the next five years.

Why Is the Glass Still Half-Empty?

Clearly, the 1992 riots were cataclysmic events for many Angelenos. Five years later, when asked to describe in an open-ended survey question their most vivid memory of the riots, the most frequently recalled image was that of fires and smoke in parts of Los Angeles. Looting and the beating of truck driver Reginald Denny also stood out as vivid memories. One-quarter of those surveyed in a separate 1997 poll said they still thought about the riots often. (Guerra 1997, *Los Angeles Times* 1997) A decade after the riots, almost the same proportion of those polled, 23 percent, has moved to Los Angeles within the past ten years.³ Strikingly, almost the same proportion, 24 percent, has lived in Los Angeles since the 1965 Watts riots. Overall, 49 percent of respondents have lived in Los Angeles for over 20 years.

The passage of time and the turnover of residents notwithstanding, the riots are part of the city's collective memory. Although most residents are upbeat about many aspects of life in Los Angeles, 50 percent believe that the outbreak of more riots in the near-term remains a distinct possibility. Specifically, when asked whether "other riots and disturbances like those in 1992 will occur in the City of Los Angeles in the next five years," 19 percent responded that the prospect of more riots is "very likely," and 31 percent responded that more riots are "somewhat likely." By contrast, 21 percent believe that similar riots within the next five years are very unlikely, and 20 percent believe them to be somewhat unlikely. African Americans are more pessimistic than other ethnic

groups about the prospect of more riots occurring within the next five years (55 percent versus 50 percent for all respondents, $p = .004$).

Table 8 Likelihood of Riots in the Next Few Years by Ethnicity: Change Over Time

Opinion	All		Ethnicity							
	1997	2002	White		African American		Latino		Asian	
			1997	2002	1997	2002	1997	2002	1997	2002
Very likely	26%	19%	27%	16%	24%	24%	25%	20%	9%	11%
Somewhat likely	35%	31%	37%	32%	26%	31%	39%	29%	28%	38%
Somewhat unlikely	16%	20%	13%	24%	17%	13%	15%	21%	31%	17%
Very unlikely	18%	21%	19%	19%	21%	21%	16%	21%	19%	29%

Respondents are less pessimistic than those who participated in previous surveys. In a 1992 poll, more than 60 percent reported that they believed similar riots or disturbances were likely to occur again. (*Los Angeles Times* 1992) Support for that point of view held steady in a 1997 poll, in which 61 percent believed similar riots were somewhat likely or very likely to occur within five years. Specifically, 26 percent believed another riot was very likely in the next five years, and 35 percent believed another riot was somewhat likely in the next five years. By contrast, 18 percent of the 1997 survey respondents believed other riots were very unlikely, and 20 percent believed other riots were somewhat unlikely to occur again within five years. (Guerra 1997) Although generally less pessimistic about the short-term prospects for more riots than in 1992 or 1997, half of our respondents still feel wary.

What accounts for this apparently widespread concern? Is the expectation of future riots artificially inflated, an artifice of the construction of the survey or an accident due to the timing of the poll? Or are there attitudinal and demographic factors that systematically contribute to respondents' expectations of future riots? Several survey

questions placed before the question about the likelihood of future riots may have primed respondents to give heightened consideration to the possibility of another conflagration. It is also possible that the prospect of new riots seemed more credible because of a set of events that transpired as the poll was underway. In particular, interviews were being conducted just as a headline-grabbing controversy was unfolding over the reappointment of Bernard Parks, the city's African American police chief. James Hahn, the city's White mayor who had won a close election largely on the strength of African American support, had recently announced that he would not support Parks' reappointment. African American civic leaders responded with charges that the mayor had betrayed the Black community. With this high-profile battle raging, respondents were asked whether they support or oppose the reappointment of Parks for a second term. Among the major ethnic groups, African Americans were most in favor of Parks' reappointment (66 percent versus 43 percent overall), and they were also far less likely not to have an opinion about his reappointment (12 percent versus 20 percent overall, $p = .000$). It is possible that these events made the prospect of riots more plausible to our respondents – particularly African Americans.

While acknowledging the possibility that questionnaire priming and survey timing may have inflated the reported expectations of future riots above some actual baseline, in the following sections we examine the impact of respondents' attitudes and demographic profile on their expectations of future riots. Of our 1,600 respondents, 143 (8.9 percent) refused to hazard a guess about the likelihood of riots occurring. Eliminating these respondents left a sample of 1,457 people who expressed an opinion on this topic. The dependent variable – the likelihood of riots like the ones in 1992 occurring within the next five years – is categorical and takes on only four unique values: very unlikely,

somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely and very likely. Consequently, we used ordered probit analysis to test the strength of the relationship between a respondent's attitudes and demographic profile and their opinion regarding the likelihood of more riots. Replication of the analyses using ordinary least squares regression yields no substantive differences in the significance or sign of any coefficients. In combination with a post-estimation analysis, the results of the probit analysis allows ready interpretation of the substantive impact of possible explanatory variables on the probability that a respondent believes a riot is likely to occur.

Included Measures

We include four sets of independent variables in the analysis: (1) attitudes about racial and ethnic issues and the respondent's ethnicity; (2) opinions relevant to social polarization and social capital in Los Angeles; (3) opinions toward Los Angeles civic leaders and institutions; and (4) demographic characteristics of the respondent including education, income, place of residence, and tenure in Los Angeles. The first three categories of independent variables correspond to the factors commentators have identified as precipitating riot conditions in 1992. Because these factors are interrelated, many of the independent variables overlap categories. For example, we classify our faith in institutions measure as an indicator of attitudes toward civic leadership and institutions although it could reasonably be considered an indicator of accumulated social capital. Similarly, we classify support for the reappointment of the former police chief as a racial attitude, but it could reasonably be viewed as a perception of civic leadership. In short, our categorization of independent variables is somewhat subjective, employed primarily for organizational purposes.

The first set of independent variables included in the multivariate analysis surround race and responses to questions concerning racial issues. The first variable is a measure of the importance of improving ethnic relations in Los Angeles. Interviewers read respondents a list of four options: extremely important, very important, somewhat important, or not at all important. The second variable measures the respondent's opinion about whether progress toward improving race relations has been made since 1992. This variable was recoded so that it represents whether the respondent believes no progress has been made. The third variable in this category taps whether the respondent considers the lack of a majority ethnic group to be a good thing, a bad thing, or whether the lack of a majority group makes no difference. This variable was recoded to register whether the respondent considers the lack of a single ethnic majority to be a bad thing for thing for Los Angeles. The fourth variable measures whether the respondent believes immigrants are a benefit to Los Angeles because of their hard work or whether they are a burden because they use public services. This variable was recoded to register whether the respondent views immigrants as a burden. This first category of independent variables also includes a measure of support for the reappointment of Bernard Parks for a second term as chief of police. Given the spectacle of a White mayor dismissing this African American appointee amid highly publicized charges of betrayal that went up from Black civic leaders, this measure may serve as a proxy for African Americans' perceptions of ethnic relations. We expect each of these attitudinal variables to be positively related to expectations of riots occurring.

Four dichotomous variables for ethnicity are also included in this first category of independent variables: Asian, Black, Latino, and White -- excluding those who reported "other" or "don't know." Although Table 8 (above) indicates that opinions about the

likelihood of future riots were remarkably uniform across ethnic groups, interethnic differences may become apparent when we control for other independent variables. Taken together, this first set of variables attempts to isolate the underlying racial and ethnic tension that may exist in Los Angeles and lead respondents to believe riots are probable in the future.

Our second set of independent variables attempts to isolate how social polarization and poor social capital influences expectations of riots. First, we consider whether respondents believe the city is moving in the wrong direction. Second, we consider whether respondents doubt that neighborhood councils will improve the responsiveness of city government to neighborhood issues. Third, we consider whether respondents expect the current economic slowdown to negatively impact Los Angeles. Fourth, we consider if the respondent believes that reducing crime in Los Angeles is important. These four measures are intended to gauge respondent' negative perceptions of the social setting in Los Angeles. As with the first set of variables, we expect this second set of measures to be positively related to expectations of future riots.

The third set of independent variables taps attitudes about civic leaders and institutions. First, our index of faith in institutions includes general impressions of the city council, city attorney, county board, police department, state government, and religious institutions. Respondents were asked to rank these institutions on a scale of one to four: very unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, somewhat favorable, or very favorable. Based on the sum of respondents' rankings, we created an average faith in institutions index. Second, interviewers asked respondents to provide their assessments of African American, Asian, and Latino civic leaders. Each assessment is a dummy variable taking on a value of one for a very or somewhat unfavorable rating or a value of zero for a very

or somewhat favorable rating. Third, we consider whether respondents believe the Los Angeles Police Department is doing a poor or very poor job. We expect to find these three variables to be positively associated with expectations of more riots.

The final set of independent variables includes demographic control variables: education, a categorical measure scaled from one to eight; income, a categorical dummy variables for various income ranges⁴; age, a categorical measure scaled from one to six; gender, coded as one for female and zero for men; and an indicator of residence in the San Fernando Valley, with Valley residents coded as one and residents of other parts of the city coded as zero. The dummy variable for San Fernando Valley residence is included to ascertain if residents where a campaign to secede from Los Angeles was underway had significantly different expectations about future riots, compared to residents of other parts of the city. Additionally, we include three measures that tap respondents' ties to the Los Angeles area. The first measures home ownership status. The second is a categorical measure ranging from one to eight capturing how many years the respondent has lived in Los Angeles. The third is a dummy measure for whether or not the respondent lived in Los Angeles during the 1992 riots.

We have mixed expectations concerning the impact of these “community ties” variables. Previous polls have found homeowners to be more optimistic than renters about the direction of their communities (Guerra and Marks 2001), but they may also be more wary of potential threats to their investment in real estate. Residents who experienced the riots in 1992 – and even the Watts riots of 1965 – may be more fearful of additional riots. Then again, they may be less apt to cry wolf and predict additional riots unless they perceive specific dangerous conditions that they experienced in the past.

Approach and Estimates

To delve into the question of why – despite general optimism – so many respondents view riots as imminent, we report five different estimates of expectations of future riots. Previous scholarship gives us reason to believe all four sets of independent variables described above may have an important impact on respondents’ expectations of future riots. However, the sheer volume of scholarship and journalism concerning ethnic divisions in Los Angeles leads us to expect that the respondent’s ethnicity and opinions regarding racial issues would be most significantly and robustly related to expectations of future riots. However, the lack of substantial differences in predictions of future riots among ethnic groups, as indicated in Table 8, gives us pause. We wondered if a respondent’s ethnicity, in combination with the respondent’s opinions on various topics, might have a significant impact on their expectations of future riots. Table 9 represents the results of a basic model, and Table 10 includes the results of four models that incorporate interaction effects between a respondent’s ethnicity and several of the variables included in the basic model.

Tables 9 and 10 include the ordered probit coefficients, associated standard errors and p-values of the point estimates, and a calculation of the changes in predicted probabilities for the variables in the models. The significance and the direction of the variable on the respondent’s expectation of riots can be seen by examining the first column of entries, along with coefficients, standard errors and p-values. The p-values we report are derived using two-tailed tests. In the tables below we use bold font to delineate which variables attain statistical significance at or beyond $p \leq .10$.

Ordered probit coefficients are not directly interpretable beyond sign and significance. In order to make the coefficients contained in Tables 9 and 10 more readily

interpretable, we calculate changes in predicted probabilities. Holding all other independent variables at their means, these estimates allow for a direct interpretation of the effects of a given independent variable in changing the probability of believing riots are likely to occur (See Long and Freese 2001, Long 1997). There are several different available estimates of these changes. Here, we report two: the average change in the likelihood of thinking riots will occur associated with a minimum to maximum change in the independent variable; and the actual predicted probability associated with each unit of the dependent variable. The resulting values are expressed in percentages and recorded to the right of the ordered probit results.

For example, our first included variable concerns the degree to which respondent believes ethnic relations need to be improved. The average change associated with this variable is about 4.8 percent – meaning that a respondent who agrees most strongly that ethnic relations need to be improved will be 4.8 percent more likely on average to believe that more riots are likely compared to a respondent who disagrees most strongly that ethnic relations need to be improved. The next four columns indicate the change associated with each unit of the dependant variable. Not surprisingly, a shift from thinking ethnic relations are fine (0) to thinking ethnic relations need to be improved (1) obtains a negative value in the first two level changes of the dependant variable (zero to one, and one to two) and a positive value for the last two level changes (two to three and three to four). This shows simply that the more likely a respondent is to believe ethnic relations need improvement, the more likely the respondent is to expect additional riots will occur.

[Table 9 about here]

Given the volume of scholarship and media reporting regarding ethnic conflict in Los Angeles, we were surprised by the findings for our first set of variables. These results indicate a strong relationship between attitudes on racial issues and expectations of riots but no relationship between the respondent's ethnicity and expectations of riots. Whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asians were no more or less likely to expect more riots in the next few years. However, respondents who feel ethnic relations need to be improved or that no progress has been made on race relations since 1992 are significantly more likely to think a riot may occur. In addition, those who believe a lack of an ethnic majority is bad for the city are more likely to report that Los Angeles is likely to face another riot within the next few years.

The average change values listed immediately to the right of the p-values indicate that the changes in the dependent variable generated by these independent variables are among the largest for all of variables included in the model of expectations of future riots. Between 4.7 percent and 7.2 percent, these values indicate that those residents who believe that ethnic relations are in poor shape are far more likely to believe riots are imminent. No relationship at all was found between attitudes towards immigrants and expectations of riots, suggesting perhaps that anti-immigrant attitudes are unlikely to touch off riots. Interestingly, support or opposition for the city's then African American police chief has no apparent relationship to expectations of future riots.

As presaged in Table 8, not a single ethnic group dummy variable comes close to statistical significance. Given that the question concerning expectations of riots made reference to the 1992 civil unrest – an event that exposed interethnic tensions – and given a series of questions earlier in the survey that might have heightened feelings of ethnic group identity, it is surprising that the respondent's ethnicity has no measurable influence

on their assessments of the likelihood of riots. In sum, our first set of independent variables shows that respondents with negative outlooks on racial issues are more likely to anticipate riots. However, members of ethnic groups do not differ in their expectations of riots.

Our second category includes a series of social polarization and social capital measures. Residents who believe Los Angeles is moving in the wrong direction and residents who believe neighborhood councils will fail to increase the responsiveness of city government are more likely to anticipate future riots. Respondents who are worried about the impact of a sluggish economy on Los Angeles are also significantly more likely to anticipate a future riot. The relationship between perceiving the reduction of crime to be important is positively related to the anticipation of future riots, but the relationship is not statistically significant.

Substantively, pessimism regarding the impact of the poor economy has the largest impact on the expectation of riots among the variables included in this second set of measures. Holding the other variables constant, a shift in economic outlook from most optimistic to most pessimistic increases the expectation of future riots by approximately 6.3 percent. Negative perceptions of neighborhood councils, although significantly related to believing riots are likely, have a smaller impact. Evidently, respondents' concern that a poor economy could foster riot conditions exceeds their consternation that the creation of neighborhood councils is unlikely to improve governmental responsiveness.

The third set of independent variables focuses on attitudes toward civic leaders and institutions. The first of these, our faith in institutions index, is insignificantly related to attitudes on riots occurring. This finding is interesting because well-functioning

governmental and civic institutions might be expected to mitigate conditions that could foment another riot, including interethnic tension and social polarization. This third set of variables also includes an assessment of the police department's job performance. Despite a highly publicized corruption scandal involving the Rampart police division, assessments of the police department have no impact on expectations of riots. Similarly, assessments of local ethnic group leaders have no impact on expectations of future riots – with the exception of assessments of African American civic leaders. Recall that these measures capture the degree to which respondents hold a negative view of minority group leaders' job performance. Interestingly, holding a negative perception of the job performance of Latino and Asian leaders has no relationship to the expectation of riots, whereas those who give low marks to African American leaders are significantly more likely to anticipate riots. Perhaps this relationship was driven by the specter of local African American leaders charging that the city's White mayor had betrayed the Black community. Possessing negative views of African American leaders reduces the probability that a respondent expects future riots by about 5 percent on average. None of the other civic leadership and institutions variables included in the model have a significant or substantial effect on perceptions of the likelihood of riots, neither causing residents to expect more riots nor mitigating against that expectation.

Our fourth category of independent variables includes demographic controls. Those in the lowest income category are more likely to expect future riots. Conversely, more highly educated respondents are less likely to expect future riots. Surprisingly, residents who lived in Los Angeles during the 1992 riots are significantly less likely to believe a riot will occur, whereas residents who chose to relocate to Los Angeles since 1992 are more likely to expect additional riots. The influence of having moved to Los

Angeles within the last ten years amounts to a change of 6.1 percent in the expectation of a future riot, one of the largest effects of all the variables included in the model.

By contrast, whether or not the respondent resides in the San Fernando Valley makes no significant impact on expectations of riots. Notwithstanding the campaign unfolding in that area to break away from the rest of the city, San Fernando Valley respondents are no different from respondents in other parts of Los Angeles in their perception of the likelihood of riots. On this dimension at least, residents of the Valley and the rest of Los Angeles share common ground.

Taken as a whole, the results show several surprising results. Paramount among these is that although opinions and perceptions of racial issues have a significant impact, the respondent's ethnicity has no bearing on expectations of future riots. It is possible, however, that ethnicity plays a more subtle role in driving expectations of riots, working in combination with other independent variables to condition expectations of riots. To further examine this possibility that ethnicity has an indirect impact, Table 10 summarizes four models that introduce several interaction terms into the previous estimate.

The evidence displayed in Table 10 shows no such indirect effect. The results verify the negligible effects of the respondent's ethnicity on his or her assessment of the likelihood of future riots. Four estimates are presented – one each for Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians. We re-estimated the same model reported in Table 9, this time adding interaction variables for each ethnic group. We interacted the ethnicity dummy variables with each of the racial attitude variables. We conducted this analysis in two ways for each ethnic group – with all interactions included in a single model and with only one set of group interactions at a time. The substantive results are largely consistent

across the two types of models. The group-by-group interaction models are presented in Table 10 largely because they clarify the interpretation, they do not exhaust as many degrees of freedom, and they do not introduce additional colinearity into the model.

[Table 10 about here]

What is most striking about the results in Table 10 is that the respondent's ethnicity has no meaningful role in predicting expectations of riots, even in a mediating capacity. The insignificance of ethnicity holds true across nearly all the interactions and across nearly all four ethnic groups. All but one of the interaction terms fails to attain statistical significance. In large measure, the inclusion of the interaction terms does little to change the relative importance of any of the other included variables in a meaningful way. The single exception is that those Asians who perceive the lack of a single ethnic majority as problematic are significantly less likely to expect another riot. This result is anomalous and contrary to any of our expectations. With this sole exception, including interaction terms for ethnicity in the model does not alter our previous results: ethnic identity plays an insignificant role in shaping expectations of additional riots.

The results are unambiguous. Many of the factors anticipated to be important in driving expectations of riots do in fact exert a positive and significant influence. These factors include negative assessments of racial issues and negative assessments of the city's social fabric. Less compelling were the variables included in our third category, which focus primarily on faith in institutions and evaluations of civic leaders and institutions. The insignificance of ethnicity in driving expectations of future riots remains our most surprising finding.

Conclusion

On April 29, 2002, Reuters reported that Los Angeles was “tentatively, hopefully, and a little reluctantly” marking the tenth anniversary of the events “that exposed the city of angels as a modern hell of racial tension, social neglect, and glaring disparity between rich and poor.” (Reuters 2002) While commentaries by outsiders tended predictably toward hyperbole, the survey results reported here suggest that Angelenos have a more nuanced view of life in their city.

Los Angeles residents are troubled by a number of trends and conditions. Crime, public education, job opportunities, and affordable health care top their list of concerns. Most residents are also troubled by the population growth projected for Los Angeles over the next decade. The starkest sign of trouble comes from the one out of two who say another riot is likely in the next five years. Although that proportion is down from 1992 and 1997, that 50 percent expect more riots in the near-term should be a loud call for information and reflection, dialogue and action. In terms of attitudes on racial issues, those respondents who believe ethnic relations need improvement, see no progress on ethnic relations since 1992, or perceive as problematic the city’s lack of a single ethnic majority are all more likely to expect another riot to occur within the next five years. Even among the respondents who hold those opinions, there is virtually no difference between Whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in their evaluations of the likelihood of additional riots. Some solace may be taken from the fact that *no ethnic group stands out as more pessimistic about this prospect than the other ethnic groups.*

More generally, in a city that not long ago was torn apart by violence and fear, this study reveals signs of community strength that ought not to be minimized. Residents

are much more upbeat about the city's direction than they were even five years ago. They are even more optimistic about their neighborhoods. Ten years ago, Los Angeles seemed so hopelessly divided that Rodney King was moved to ask, "Please, can't we all just get along?" Today, most residents believe progress on ethnic relations has been made, and most believe ethnic groups are getting along well. Polls over the past decade chart steady improvement on both scores. Ten years ago, civic leaders proclaimed with conviction belied by their stridency that Los Angeles' greatest strength lies in its diversity. Today, residents are almost nonchalant about the ethnic mix in Los Angeles, nearly equally likely to view the city's diversity as a good thing as something that "just is." Residents are also reaching out to their neighbors, and the willingness of many to pay higher taxes and fees if necessary to avoid cutbacks in local services indicates their concern for the community as a whole.

In short, the picture that emerges from this latest survey of public opinion is as complicated as Los Angeles itself. For other multiethnic cities looking for signs of what their own futures hold, these survey results contain messages of warning as well as hope. Angelenos themselves believe that much healing has occurred since 1992, and they acknowledge that much hard work remains in building a more just, livable, and prosperous city.

Table 9. Basic Model

<i>Independent Variables</i>	Ordered Probit Regression			Post-estimation analysis. Min→Max reported.				
	Coef.	Std. Error	P> z	Avg. Chg.	0	1	2	3
<i>(1) Racial and Ethnic Attitudes and Identity</i>								
<i>etb_relat</i>	0.0804	-0.0386	0.037	0.0478	-0.0757	-0.0199	0.0311	0.0645
<i>noprogress</i>	0.2428	-0.0673	0.000	0.0476	-0.0717	-0.0235	0.0254	0.0698
<i>no_majbad</i>	0.3792	-0.1075	0.000	0.0722	-0.1021	-0.0424	0.0263	0.1182
<i>imm_burden</i>	0.0362	-0.0728	0.619	0.0071	-0.011	-0.0033	0.0042	0.0101
<i>pro_parks</i>	-0.0021	-0.0653	0.974	0.0004	0.0007	0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0006
<i>latino</i>	-0.1123	-0.1856	0.545	0.0222	0.0343	0.0101	-0.0133	-0.0311
<i>black</i>	-0.0612	-0.198	0.757	0.0121	0.019	0.0053	-0.0076	-0.0167
<i>asian</i>	-0.2061	-0.2134	0.334	0.041	0.0667	0.0153	-0.0291	-0.0529
<i>white</i>	-0.0398	-0.1868	0.831	0.0079	0.0122	0.0035	-0.0048	-0.011
<i>(2) Social Polarization and Social Capital</i>								
<i>city_wrong</i>	0.1595	-0.0721	0.027	0.0313	-0.0474	-0.0153	0.0171	0.0456
<i>notrespon</i>	0.1394	-0.0792	0.078	0.0274	-0.0412	-0.0135	0.0147	0.0401
<i>neg_econ</i>	0.1054	-0.0377	0.005	0.0625	-0.0988	-0.0262	0.0401	0.0849
<i>red_crime</i>	0.0671	-0.0497	0.177	0.04	-0.0641	-0.0158	0.0272	0.0528
<i>(3) Civic Leaders and Institutions</i>								
<i>faith_inst</i>	-0.005	-0.0185	0.786	0.0059	0.0091	0.0028	-0.0035	-0.0084
<i>neg_latino</i>	0.0317	-0.1161	0.785	0.0063	-0.0096	-0.0029	0.0036	0.0089
<i>neg_black</i>	0.2567	-0.1133	0.023	0.0497	-0.0724	-0.0271	0.0223	0.0771
<i>neg_asian</i>	0.0392	-0.1128	0.728	0.0077	-0.0118	-0.0037	0.0044	0.011
<i>lapd_badjob</i>	0.0442	-0.0444	0.319	0.0261	-0.0399	-0.0124	0.0149	0.0374
<i>(4) Demographic Control Variables</i>								
<i>education</i>	-0.0385	-0.0184	0.036	0.0531	0.0818	0.0243	-0.0312	-0.0749
<i>k40_70</i>	-0.259	-0.0875	0.003	0.0514	0.0833	0.0196	-0.0359	-0.067
<i>k70_100</i>	0.0573	-0.1131	0.612	0.0113	-0.0172	-0.0054	0.0064	0.0162
<i>k100_150</i>	0.108	-0.1445	0.455	0.0212	-0.0317	-0.0106	0.0112	0.0312
<i>over150k</i>	-0.0634	-0.1961	0.747	0.0126	0.0197	0.0054	-0.008	-0.0172
<i>inc_miss</i>	-0.2121	-0.084	0.012	0.0421	0.0674	0.0168	-0.0284	-0.0558
<i>age_grp</i>	-0.0103	-0.0233	0.659	0.0102	0.0157	0.0046	-0.0061	-0.0142
<i>female</i>	0.075	-0.0627	0.231	0.0148	-0.0229	-0.0068	0.0088	0.0208
<i>valley_zip</i>	-0.0449	-0.0808	0.578	0.0089	0.0138	0.004	-0.0054	-0.0123
<i>home_own</i>	-0.0264	-0.0697	0.704	0.0052	0.0081	0.0024	-0.0031	-0.0073
<i>years_la</i>	0.0255	-0.0275	0.353	0.0354	-0.0554	-0.0154	0.0222	0.0486
<i>in_la_1992</i>	-0.3167	-0.1275	0.013	0.0613	0.0898	0.0329	-0.0281	-0.0946
<i>Cut1</i>	-0.2245	-0.3245						
<i>Cut2</i>	0.3757	-0.3249						
<i>Cut3</i>	1.3598	-0.326						
<i>N</i>	1264							
<i>Chi</i>	115.4		0.000					

Table 10. Race Interactions Model

<i>Independent Variables</i>	WHITES			BLACKS			LATINOS			ASIANS		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> z
<i>(1) Racial and Ethnic Attitudes and Identity</i>												
<i>eth_relat</i>	0.1008	-0.0457	0.027	0.0702	-0.0408	0.085	0.034	-0.0515	0.509	0.0821	-0.04	0.040
<i>eth_relat * race</i>	-0.0662	-0.08	0.408	0.0782	-0.1141	0.493	0.1016	-0.0739	0.169	-0.03	-0.1379	0.828
<i>noprogress</i>	0.2235	-0.0802	0.005	0.2204	-0.0725	0.002	0.3288	-0.0921	0.000	0.2344	-0.069	0.001
<i>noprogress * race</i>	0.0643	-0.1441	0.655	0.1505	-0.1903	0.429	-0.1862	-0.1331	0.162	0.2009	-0.2951	0.496
<i>no_majbad</i>	0.3806	-0.1177	0.001	0.4052	-0.1179	0.001	0.2852	-0.156	0.068	0.4279	-0.1119	0.000
<i>no_majbad * race</i>	0.0234	-0.2756	0.932	-0.0954	-0.2781	0.731	0.1703	-0.2116	0.421	-0.7357	-0.4243	0.083
<i>imm_burden</i>	0.0311	-0.0732	0.671	0.0344	-0.0734	0.639	0.0308	-0.0733	0.674	0.024	-0.0732	0.743
<i>latino</i>	-0.1133	-0.1858	0.542	-0.1121	-0.1856	0.546	-0.3148	-0.3539	0.374	-0.1131	-0.1857	0.543
<i>black</i>	-0.0614	-0.1983	0.757	-0.5366	-0.4991	0.282	-0.0449	-0.1989	0.821	-0.0589	-0.198	0.766
<i>asian</i>	-0.2047	-0.2135	0.338	-0.2074	-0.2134	0.331	-0.1956	-0.2137	0.360	-0.2962	-0.6749	0.661
<i>white</i>	0.2644	-0.3804	0.487	-0.0387	-0.1869	0.836	-0.0332	-0.1873	0.859	-0.0333	-0.1869	0.859
<i>(2) Social Polarization and Social Capital</i>												
<i>city_wrong</i>	0.16	-0.0722	0.027	0.1589	-0.0721	0.028	0.165	-0.0723	0.023	0.1662	-0.0723	0.021
<i>notrespon</i>	0.1404	-0.0793	0.077	0.1397	-0.0793	0.078	0.1381	-0.0795	0.082	0.1277	-0.0796	0.109
<i>neg_econ</i>	0.1072	-0.0377	0.004	0.1047	-0.0377	0.006	0.1041	-0.0378	0.006	0.1023	-0.0378	0.007
<i>red_crime</i>	0.0678	-0.0499	0.174	0.0628	-0.0498	0.208	0.0649	-0.0498	0.193	0.0683	-0.0498	0.170
<i>(3) Civic Leaders and Institutions</i>												
<i>faith_inst</i>	-0.0046	-0.0185	0.803	-0.0031	-0.0186	0.867	-0.0048	-0.0185	0.794	-0.0045	-0.0185	0.810
<i>neg_latino</i>	0.0346	-0.1163	0.766	0.0394	-0.1163	0.735	0.0311	-0.1162	0.789	0.0331	-0.1164	0.776
<i>neg_black</i>	0.2953	-0.1367	0.031	0.2332	-0.1185	0.049	0.2477	-0.1417	0.081	0.2677	-0.1156	0.021
<i>neg_black * race</i>	-0.1148	-0.202	0.570	0.1932	-0.3485	0.579	0.0118	-0.2016	0.953	-0.2814	-0.3841	0.464
<i>pro_parks</i>	-0.0045	-0.0654	0.945	-0.0016	-0.0653	0.981	-0.0018	-0.0654	0.978	0.0003	-0.0654	0.996
<i>lapd_badjob</i>	0.0559	-0.0499	0.263	0.0332	-0.0481	0.489	0.0555	-0.063	0.379	0.0374	-0.0456	0.412
<i>lapd_badjob * race</i>	-0.0543	-0.1025	0.596	-0.079	-0.1159	0.495	-0.0267	-0.0849	0.753	0.1092	-0.1911	0.568
<i>neg_asian</i>	0.0432	-0.113	0.702	0.0424	-0.1136	0.709	0.051	-0.1133	0.653	0.0607	-0.114	0.595
<i>(4) Demographic Control Variables</i>												
<i>education</i>	-0.0379	-0.0184	0.040	-0.0391	-0.0185	0.034	-0.0385	-0.0184	0.037	-0.0387	-0.0184	0.035
<i>k40_70</i>	-0.2586	-0.0877	0.003	-0.2621	-0.0877	0.003	-0.2561	-0.0878	0.004	-0.2563	-0.0877	0.003
<i>k70_100</i>	0.0573	-0.1132	0.613	0.0523	-0.1132	0.644	0.0645	-0.1135	0.570	0.0527	-0.1134	0.642
<i>k100_150</i>	0.1047	-0.1451	0.471	0.1093	-0.1447	0.450	0.1011	-0.1447	0.485	0.101	-0.1446	0.485
<i>over150k</i>	-0.0493	-0.197	0.802	-0.0652	-0.1966	0.740	-0.0636	-0.1966	0.746	-0.0714	-0.1963	0.716
<i>inc_miss</i>	-0.2075	-0.0842	0.014	-0.2092	-0.0842	0.013	-0.2019	-0.0842	0.016	-0.2172	-0.0841	0.010
<i>age_grp</i>	-0.0095	-0.0234	0.685	-0.0092	-0.0234	0.693	-0.011	-0.0234	0.638	-0.0107	-0.0233	0.647
<i>female</i>	0.0768	-0.0629	0.222	0.0764	-0.0628	0.224	0.075	-0.0628	0.233	0.0726	-0.0628	0.248
<i>valley_zip</i>	-0.0464	-0.081	0.566	-0.0443	-0.081	0.584	-0.0551	-0.0812	0.497	-0.0442	-0.0809	0.585
<i>home_own</i>	-0.0263	-0.0698	0.706	-0.0226	-0.0701	0.747	-0.0188	-0.0698	0.787	-0.0303	-0.0698	0.665
<i>years_la</i>	0.0248	-0.0276	0.368	0.025	-0.0276	0.364	0.0258	-0.0275	0.349	0.0257	-0.0275	0.350
<i>in_la_1992</i>	-0.3084	-0.1278	0.016	-0.3178	-0.1277	0.013	-0.3202	-0.1276	0.012	-0.3138	-0.1276	0.014
<i>Cut1</i>	-0.1244	-0.3418		-0.2951	-0.3302		-0.3207	-0.351		-0.233	-0.3267	
<i>Cut2</i>	0.476	-0.3422		0.3056	-0.3305		0.28	-0.3513		0.3678	-0.327	
<i>Cut3</i>	1.4609	-0.3434		1.2907	-0.3315		1.2659	-0.3523		1.3541	-0.3281	
<i>N</i>	1264			1264			1264			1264		
<i>Chi</i>	116.73		0.000	117.67		0.000	119.86		0.000	119.12		0.000

NOTES

¹ Loss estimates vary. Multiple 911 emergency calls greatly inflated initial arson reports. The early estimate of 60 fatalities was also scaled back as a number of deaths were reclassified as “normal” homicides with non-riot related causes during a period when Los Angeles County averaged over 40 murders per week. (Kopetman 1993, Feldman 1992, Zamichow 1992.

² Cited in Kotkin 2002.

³ According to the United States Census, the population of Los Angeles increased by 6 percent between 1990 and 2000.

⁴ We made dummy variables from the income responses to allow us to include those who failed to report income in the subsequent models. We expect increased income to lead to less pessimism concerning riots, but we are agnostic about how those who failed to report income are likely to respond. Running the estimates with and without these individuals, with income as distinct dummies or as a single categorical measure, yields no substantive differences in our results.

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